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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to explain inter-state variation in non-compliance with European law. While non-compliance 
has not significantly increased over time, some member states violate European law more frequently than 
others.  In  order  to  account  for  the  variance  observed,  we  draw  on  three  prominent  approaches  in  the 
compliance literature – enforcement, management, and legitimacy. In the first place, we develop a set of 
hypotheses  for  each  of  the  three  theories.  We  then  discuss  how  they  can  be  combined  in  theoretically 
consistent ways and develop three integrated models. Finally, we empirically test these models drawing on a 
unique  and  comprehensive  dataset,  which  comprises  more  than  6,300  instances  of  member  state  non-
compliance with European law between 1978 and 1999. The empirical findings show that the combined 
model of the enforcement and the management approach turns out to have the highest explanatory power. 
Politically powerful member states are most likely to violate European law while the best compliers are small 
countries with highly efficient bureaucracies. Yet, administrative capacity also matters for powerful member 
states. The UK and Germany are much more compliant than France and Italy, which command similar 
political power but whose administrations are ridden by bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. 
 
 
 
http://www.fu-berlin.de/europa    1 
1.  Introduction1 
 
One of the major questions in the research on international institutions has been “why governments, 
seeking to promote their own interests, ever comply with the rules of international regimes when 
they view these rules as in conflict with [...] their myopic self-interest”.2 While realists argue that 
states simply do not comply if the costs of a rule are too high, rational institutionalists point to the 
role  of  international  regimes  and  organizations,  which  entail  monitoring,  sanctioning,  and 
adjudication mechanisms increasing the costs of non-compliance. Management theories, by contrast, 
focus  on  capacity-building  and  rule  specification.  Social  constructivists,  finally,  stress  legitimacy, 
socialization, and norm internalization through processes of social learning and persuasion. Thus, 
different International Relations approaches provide different explanations for why states comply. 
They have paid less attention to the question of why some states comply better than others.  
 
This paper seeks to find out why some states are more inclined to comply with international norms 
and rules  than others.  The  European Union  (EU)  is an  ideal  case  to  explore  this  question.  As 
‘masters of the treaties’, the member states still have a significant say on the norms and rules they 
have  to  comply  with.  At  the  same  time,  EU  institutions  entail  highly  legalized  monitoring, 
adjudication,  and  sanctioning  mechanisms.  They  do  not  only  aim  at  changing  the  instrumental 
calculations of states by increasing the costs of non-compliance, but also allow for rule specification 
and capacity-building and promote processes of social learning and persuasion. Thus, all approaches 
should expect a rather high level of compliance. Many students of European politics would agree 
that the EU, compared to many international regimes, does not suffer from serious compliance 
problems.3 Yet, the member states vary significantly in their compliance with European law. Why is it, 
for example, that EU-skeptic Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark belong to the compliance leaders 
while  more  EU-friendly  Italy,  France,  or  Portugal  join  the  group  of  the  laggards?  Or  why  do 
                                                 
1   We thank Andrea Liese, Katarina Linos, Thomas Risse, Beth Simmons, Paul Schure, Cornelia Ulbert, 
Karen Alter, Robert  Falkner, the  participants  of  the Wheatherhead Center  of  International Affairs 
seminar  on  International  Law  and  International  Relations  at  Harvard,  and  the  participants  of  the 
Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance Faculty Colloquium in International Relations at 
Princeton  for  detailed  comments.  Needless  to  say,  we  are  solely  responsible  for  any  conceptual, 
methodological, or empirical errors that may remain. 
2   Keohane 1984: 99. 
3   Zürn and Joerges 2005.   2 
centralized countries like France and Greece have equally bad compliance records as federal Belgium 
and regionalized Italy?  
 
In order to explain the varying degree of state compliance with European law, this paper draws on a 
unique and comprehensive data set. For the very first time, researchers have been granted direct 
access to the infringement database of the European Commission, which is in charge of monitoring 
compliance with European law. The Commission provided us with a complete set of all the cases it 
opened against the member states for violating European law between 1978 and 1999. Unlike the 
data published in the Commission’s Official Reports, our database contains information regarding 
the nature of non-compliance, the type of law infringed on, the policy sector to which the law 
pertains, the violating member state, and the measures taken by EU institutions in response to non-
compliance for each of the more than 6,300 infringement cases.4 The data confirm that there is 
significant variance in the level of compliance among the member states that lacks explanation. 
 
In a nutshell, we argue that member state compliance is a function of both power and capacity. 
Politically powerful member states are most likely to violate European law while the best compliers 
are small countries with highly efficient bureaucracies. Yet, administrative capacity also matters for 
powerful member states. The UK and Germany are much more compliant than France and Italy, 
which yield similar political power, but whose administrations are ridden by bureaucratic inefficiency 
and  corruption.  In  fact,  we  find  an  interaction  between  capacity  and  power,  where  capacity 
conditions the relation between power and compliance. With increasing bureaucratic efficiency, the 
non-compliance promoting effects of power are gradually reduced. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. After outlining our empirical puzzle, we review three prominent 
compliance approaches in the International Relations literature. Enforcement approaches assume 
that states violate international norms and rules voluntarily because they are not willing to bear the 
costs of compliance. By increasing external constraints, international institutions can alter strategic 
cost-benefit calculations of states and lead to a change of their preferences over strategies eventually 
resulting  in  compliance.  By  contrast,  management  approaches  argue  that  non-compliance  is 
involuntary,  i.e.  is  not  the  result  of  strategic  choices.  States  are  willing  to  comply  but  lack  the 
                                                 
4   The database will be made publicly accessible at http://www.fu-berlin.de/europa.   3 
necessary resources. The third approach – legitimacy – argues similar to enforcement theories that 
non-compliance  is  intentional.  But,  unlike  management  and  enforcement  approaches,  legitimacy 
draws  on  socialization,  persuasion,  and  learning  mechanisms.  Compliance  is  not  a  matter  of 
sufficient material resources or a question of costs and benefits of rule confirming behavior, but 
depends on whether a rule is internalized and accepted as a standard for appropriate behavior.  
 
For each of the three approaches, we develop a set of hypotheses. While the literature often treats 
them as competing or at least alternative explanations, there are good reasons, both theoretical and 
empirical, to combine them.5 We discuss three ways to integrate the power, capacity, and legitimacy 
approaches  in  a  theoretically  consistent  and  meaningful  way  and  derive  an  additional  set  of 
hypotheses for our integrated models.  
 
Next, we test our different models using quantitative methods. The empirical findings show that the 
combined model of the enforcement and the management approach has the highest explanatory 
power. The best compliers are member states that have ample administrative capacity and lack the 
power to resist compliance. Conversely, the countries with the worst compliance records are those 
with limited capacity, but enough power to resist the Commission’s enforcement efforts. Member 
states with weak capacity and limited power are not very good compliers either, but they still fare 
better than their powerful counterparts. Finally, powerful member states with strong capacity comply 
better than powerful member states with weak capacity. In short, while power has a negative impact 
on compliance it is reduced by the interaction with capacity. 
 
In the concluding section, we place the EU in a comparative perspective and discuss the extent to 
which our findings can be applied to international regimes and organization, which possess a lower 
degree  of  institutionalization  and  legalization.  Our  research  shows  that  even  highly  legalized 
international institutions do not completely mitigate power differences between states. Moreover, 
while capacity-building by international institutions is an effective way to improve compliance, it 
should combine resource transfer with measures that foster bureaucratic efficiency. 
 
 
                                                 
5   Checkel 2001; Tallberg 2002.   4 
2.   Non-Compliance in the European Union   
 
2.1.  Infringement Proceedings as a Measure of Non-compliance 
 
Studies on compliance with international norms and rules face a serious methodological challenge of 
measuring  their  dependent  variable. 6 Many  have  developed  their  own  assessment  criteria  and 
collected the empirical information in laborious case studies.7 Others have drawn on statistical data 
provided by the monitoring bodies of international regimes and organizations, like the European 
Commission has done for the EU since 1984.8 Its Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of 
Community  Law9 contain  information  on  the  legal  action  the  Commission  brought  against  the 
member  states  since  1978.  Article  226  ECT  (ex-Article  169)  entitles  the  Commission  to  open 
infringement  proceedings  against  member  states  suspected  in  violation  of  European  law.  These 
infringement  proceedings  consist  of  several  stages.  The  first  two,  suspected  infringements 
(complaints,  petitions,  etc.)  and  Formal  Letters,  are  considered  informal  and  treated  largely  as 
confidential.  The  official  infringement  procedure  (Article  226  ECT)  starts  when  the  European 
Commission issues a Reasoned Opinion and ends with a ruling of the European Court of Justice. If 
the member states still refuse to comply, the Commission can open new proceedings (Article 228 
ECT, ex-Article 171), which may result in financial penalties. Article 228 ECT proceedings consist of 
the same stages as Article 226 ECT proceedings, but the ECJ has the possibility to impose a financial 
penalty.10 
 
The  dependent  variable  of  our  study  uses  the  Reasoned  Opinions  as  a  measurement  for  non-
compliance  for  two  reasons.  First,  for  the  previous  two  stages,  the  Commission  only  provides 
aggregate data on the total number of cases brought against individual member states – information 
on  individual  cases  are  considered  confidential.  Second,  Reasoned  Opinions  concern  the  more 
serious cases of non-compliance as they refer to issues that could not be solved through informal 
negotiations at the previous, unofficial stages. Note that two-thirds of all the cases, in which the 
                                                 
6   Simmons 1998; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002. 
7   Duina 1997; Mitchell 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. 
8   For instance Reinhardt 2001, Steinberg 2002. 
9   Source: http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/eulaw/index_en.htm, last accessed on February 15, 2007. 
10   Snyder 1993; Tallberg 2002.   5 
Commission had issued a Formal Letter between 1978 and 1999, were settled before a Reasoned 
Opinion had to be sent.  
 
In order to control for the growing number of legal acts that can be potentially infringed on, we use 
the relative number of Reasoned Opinions sent per legal act rather than the absolute number per 
member state  in a  given year. Between  1978  and  1999, the  Commission opened  almost  17,000 
infringement proceedings (Formal Letters). Over the same time, the number of legal acts in force has 
more  than  doubled  from  less  than  5,000 to  almost  10,000. By taking  the number  of  Reasoned 
Opinions sent to a member states in a given year as percentage of the legal act in force at the time of 
violation in addition to using time dummies in our analyses, we avoid problems of time trends (ever-
growing  number  of  legal  acts)  and  structural  breaks  caused  by  political  events,  such  as  the 
completion of the Internal Market, which frequently haunt panel and time series analyzes.11  
 
The database, on which this paper draws, is based on a unique and comprehensive dataset including 
all the infringement proceedings in which the European Commission sent a Reasoned Opinion to 
the member states between 1978 and 1999.12 It contains more than 6,300 individual infringement 
cases, which are classified by infringement number, member state, policy sector, legal basis (CELEX 
number), legal act, type of infringement, and stage reached in the proceedings. The Commission gave 
us access to its own database. We were allowed to download all the data available for the years 1978 
to 1999 (excluding the Formal Letters). This is the very first time that researchers have received such 
data. 
 
Using  infringements  as  a  measurement  for  non-compliance  with  European  law  is  not  without 
problems. There are good reasons to question whether infringement proceedings qualify as valid and 
reliable indicators of compliance failure, that is, whether they constitute a random sample of all the 
non-compliance cases that occur. First, for reasons of limited resources, the Commission is not 
capable  of  detecting  and  legally  pursuing  all  instances  of  non-compliance  with  European  law. 
Infringement proceedings present only a fraction of all instances of non-compliance, and we have no 
means to estimate their real number. Moreover, the infringement sample could be seriously biased 
                                                 
11   Cf. Banerjee et al. 1993; Enders 2004. 
12   1978 is the first year, for which the Commission comprehensively published infringement data. 1999 is 
the last year, for which the Commission was willing to give us access to its database.   6 
since the Commission depends heavily on the member states reporting back on their implementation 
activities,  on  costly  and time-consuming  consultancy  reports,  and  on  information  from  citizens, 
interest groups, and companies. But whereas the monitoring capacity of member states and their 
domestic  actors  varies,  there  is  no  indication  that  the  limited  detection  of  non-compliance 
systematically biases infringement data towards certain member states. We have been conducting an 
expert survey, which asks 164 policy makers, civil servants, companies, interest groups, and scientific 
experts in the EU member states, which form part of our study, to asses the level of non-compliance 
in their country in general and with respect to core norms and rules in different policy areas. The 
response rate was more than 48 percent and the results correspond with the relative distribution of 
infringement  proceedings,  which  strengthens  our  confidence  that  our  data  do  not  contain  a 
systematic bias.  
 
2.2  Mapping Member State Non-compliance with European Law 
 
Our data on non-compliance with European law show significant variation among the member states 
(graph 1). Member states can be divided into three groups: leaders, laggards, and the middle-field. 
The  three  Scandinavian  member  states,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  Netherlands  are  good 
compliers and rarely violate European law. By contrast, the Southern European countries (including 
France) – with the exception of Spain – and Belgium seriously lag behind. The rest of the member 
states range in between forming the middle-field. Analyzing this pattern more closely, we also find 
that it is virtually constant over time (graph 2). Leaders stay leaders, while Italy, France, and Greece 
always belong to the group of member states with the worst compliance record. Graph 1 does not 
only present the ranking of the member states from exemplary Denmark on the left to notorious 
Italy on the right by their average non-compliance records. The box plots also shows, for example, 
that Italy receives a median of one Reasoned Opinion from the Commission per 100 legal acts in 
force each year, whereas Denmark, as well as the other Scandinavian countries not depicted in the 
graph, infringe on only one out of 1,000 legal acts on the median.  
   7 
Graph 1: Annual Reasoned Opinions per Legal Act (in %) by EU 12 Member States, 1986-99 
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
R
e
a
s
o
n
e
d
 
O
p
i
n
i
o
n
s
 
p
e
r
 
L
e
g
a
l
 
A
c
t
 
(
i
n
 
%
)
,
 
1
9
8
6
-
9
9
DN NL GB LU ES IR DE PR BE FR GR IT
 
 
Graph 2: Reasoned Opinions per Legal Act (in %) by EU 12 Member States Over Time, 1985-96 
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The distribution of non-compliance between member states is puzzling because, at first sight, none 
of  the  prominent  compliance  approaches  seems  to  provide  an  explanation  that  systematically   8 
accounts for the variance observed. Realists should ask themselves why France and Italy yield similar 
economic and political power in the EU as Germany and the UK, but are much less compliant. This 
becomes even more puzzling for management theories since France and Italy comply as badly as or 
even  worse  than  Greece  and  Portugal,  which  are  the  two  poorest  countries  in  the  EU  15. 
Constructivists should have a hard time in understanding why EU-skeptical countries like the UK, 
Denmark, Sweden, or Finland comply much better with European law than states, which are highly 
supportive  of  European  integration,  such  as  France,  Italy,  or  Belgium.  Institutionalists  have  in 
general difficulties in accounting for country variation since the level of legalization is the same for 
states within an international institution. Likewise, monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms should 
affect  the  cost-benefit  calculations  of  states  in  an  equal  way.  Variance  is  much  more  expected 
between  international  institutions,  if  they  differ  in  their  degree  of  obligation,  delegation,  and 
precision.13 Of course, the costs of (non-) compliance may vary across countries. But then we need 
an explanation for why some states face higher costs than others, something which institutionalist 
theories usually do not provide. As we will see below, combining institutionalist reasoning with a 
power-based enforcement approach is one way to solve this problem. 
 
 
3.   Three Compliance Approaches 
 
To explain why there is significant variation between member states with regard to their level of 
(non-) compliance with European law, we have to find country-based explanations. International 
Relations theories, such as enforcement, management, and legitimacy approaches, primarily focus on 
institutional  design  (monitoring  and  sanctioning,  capacity-building  and  adjudication,  and 
socialization). Consequently, they have largely been used to account for variation in compliance 
across  international  institutions. 14 However,  all  three  approaches  can  be  easily  reformulated  to 
account  for  country-based  explanatory  factors,  such  as  power  (enforcement),  the  capacity 
(management)  of  member  states  and  the  acceptance  of  international  rules  and  institutions 
(legitimacy). 
 
                                                 
13   Abbott et al. 2000; Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000. 
14   Cf. Keohane 2000, Abbott  2000    9 
3.1.   Enforcement  
 
Enforcement approaches assume that states choose to violate international norms and rules because 
they are not willing to bear the costs of compliance. Incentives for defection are particularly strong if 
international norms and rules are not compatible with national arrangements as a result of which 
compliance requires substantial changes at the domestic level.15 From this rationalist perspective, 
non-compliance  can  only  be  prevented  by  increasing  the  costs  of  non-compliance.16 Increasing 
external  constraints by  establishing  institutionalized  monitoring  and  sanctioning  mechanisms  can 
alter strategic cost-benefit calculations of states.17 The likelihood of being detected and punished 
increases the anticipated costs of non-compliance, be they material (economic sanctions or financial 
penalties)18 or immaterial (loss of reputation and credibility).19 Such costs may finally lead to a change 
of  strategic  preferences  towards  compliance.  However,  states  do  not  necessarily  face  the  same 
compliance costs nor are they equally sensitive to sanctions.20 Drawing on power-based theories of 
International Relations, we can distinguish three strands of the enforcement approach. 
 
The Power of Recalcitrance: Power Matters at the Stage of Enforcement  
Following  the  argument  of  Keohane  and  Nye  on  power  and  interdependence, 21 states  can  be 
regarded as being more sensitive to costs imposed by sanctions if they have less political or economic 
power than other states, the latter being more resistant to external pressures. With regard to our 
dependent variable, we would then expect that the less powerful EU member states are, the more 
sensitive they are to external enforcement constraints and the less likely they infringe EU legal acts, 
                                                 
15   Cf. Cortell and Davis 1996; Checkel 2001; Risse and Ropp 1999; Underdal 1998. 
16   Martin 1992; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Downs 1998; Dorn and Fulton 1997. 
17   While institutional mechanisms decentralize the costs for monitoring and restoring compliance, realist 
approaches emphasize the role of hegemonic states, which use their power resources to deter weaker 
states from non-compliance. These centralized mechanisms are, however, a less prominent strategy for 
enforcing compliance. This is because they shift monitoring and sanctioning costs to a single state, 
while institutional mechanisms are beneficial to all members adhering to the institution in that they do 
not draw on the resources of a single member. 
18   Martin 1992; Fearon 1998. 
19   Checkel  calls  this  “social  sanctioning”  Checkel  2001:  558;  cf.  Klotz  1995;  Keck  and  Sikkink  1998; 
Gurowitz 1999; Satori 2002; Schoppa 1999. 
20   Abbott et al. 2000; Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998; Horne and Cutlip 2002. 
21   Keohane and Nye 1977.   10 
hence,  the  smaller  is  their  number  of  infringements  compared  to  less  cost-sensitive,  i.e.  more 
powerful,  member  states.  Hence,  the  political  and  economic  weight  of  a  state  allows  it  to  be 
recalcitrant  with  respect  to  the  effective  implementation  of  European  law.  This  variant  of  the 
enforcement  approach  emphasizes  the  extent  to  which  power  translates  into  indifference  or 
resistance vis-à-vis external constraints imposed on states.22 The mechanism of recalcitrance thereby 
predicts a positive relationship between the power of a state and its non-compliance record. The first 
enforcement hypothesis (H1a) expects that more powerful states infringe on international and European laws 
more often than weaker states.  
 
The Power of Assertiveness: Power Matters at the Stage of Decision-making  
Another variant of the enforcement approach focuses on states, but attributes more weight to the 
decision-making process. According to this line of argumentation, the power of a member state does 
not only deploy an impact in the implementation stage (resulting in recalcitrance), but also in the 
stage of decision-making. Moreover, high power results in a better record of compliance. The political 
and economic weight of a member state is closely related to its assertiveness, i.e. its ability to shape legal 
acts according to its preferences.23 The extent to which a state has managed to impose its preferences 
during negotiating procedures determines the costs of compliance and thereby the state’s willingness 
to comply with the decision ex post. Hence, if power is defined as assertiveness in the decision-making 
process, a second enforcement hypothesis (H1b) expects that more powerful states infringe on international 
and European laws less often than weaker states.  
 
The Power of Deterrence: Power Matters for the Enforcement Authority  
The assumption of a positive impact of state power on compliance has been taken up by other strands 
of the enforcement literature which emphasize, however, another causal mechanism. According to 
this line of argumentation, the political and economic weight of a state can translate into a deterrence of 
the enforcement authority, i.e. the institution, which monitors compliance and imposes sanctions against 
free-riders and norm-violators.24 Like the hypothesis about the recalcitrance of powerful states, the 
deterrence hypothesis stresses the relationship between the non-compliant state and the enforcement 
                                                 
22   Martin 1992. 
23   Thomson et al. 2006; Giuliani 2003; Moravcsik 1997; Fearon 1998; Keohane and Nye 1977. 
24   Abbott et al. 2000; Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998; Horne and Cutlip 2002.   11 
authority. But rather than conceptualizing the power of the non-compliant state as determining its 
reaction  to  actions  of  the  enforcement  authority,  it  explains  the  behavior  of  the  enforcement 
authority in the first place. It assumes a principal-agent relation between the states (principals) and 
the enforcement authority (agent), in which the latter ultimately depends on the former since the 
states can always renounce the power of the enforcement authority.25 This asymmetrical relationship 
may induce the enforcement authority to act strategically and be reluctant to impose sanctions on 
powerful  states.  This  asymmetry  is  stronger  for  powerful  member  states  since  they  have  more 
political  weight  in  international  institutions,  which  they  could  use  to  punish  the  enforcement 
authority. Regarding the case of the European Union, the European Commission or the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) might therefore be less willing to either open infringement proceedings or 
issue  rulings  against  powerful  member  states,  since  they  finally  depend  on  the  extent  to  which 
member  states  are  willing  to  delegate  this  authority  to  them.  Thus,  similar  to  the  assertiveness 
hypothesis, the deterrence hypothesis predicts a lower record of non-compliance cases for powerful 
states. In contrast to the assertiveness hypothesis, however, powerful member states might actually 
violate  a  rule,  but  are  simply  not  being  sanctioned  for  it.  In  this  perspective,  the  deterrence 
hypothesis only allows for making predictions about the probability with which violations are prosecuted and 
sanctioned,  not  about  the  actual  occurrence  and  prevalence  of  non-compliance. 26  The  third 
enforcement  hypothesis  (H1c)  expects  that  the  more  powerful  a  state  is,  the  less  probably  it  will  face 
infringement proceedings since enforcement authorities are deterred. 
 
                                                 
25   Horne and Cutlip 2002: 301; cf. Garrett, 1998; Tallberg 2000. 
26   Cf. Reiss 1984. A proper test of the deterrence hypotheses would require an approach which looks at the 
later stages of the infringement proceedings when the material costs of imposed sanctions become 
more imminent. We have done this in a separate study, which confirms our findings for the Reasoned 
Opinion stage (Authors).   12 
Table 1: Overview of the Enforcement Hypotheses 
Power of recalcitrance (H1a)  Power of assertiveness (H1b)  Power of deterrence (H1c) 
Powerful  states  infringe  on 
European law more often than 
weak states (since they are less 
sensitive  to  the  costs  imposed 
by sanctions). 
Powerful  states  infringe  on 
European  law  less  often  than 
weak  states  (since  they  have 
been able to decrease the costs 
of  compliance  by  shaping 
European law according to their 
preferences). 
Powerful states are less likely to 
be  prosecuted  and  sanctioned 
for  infringements  against 
European  law  (since 
enforcement  authorities  are 
deterred by them). 
 
Operationalization of the Independent Variables 
In order to test for the influence of the power of recalcitrance on non-compliance, we incorporate 
two power indicators into our analyses. These indicators are widely used in the literature and account 
for different aspects of power – economic size and EU-specific political power. Gross domestic 
product (“GDP”) is a proxy for economic power.27 It influences the sensitivity towards material costs 
of  financial  penalties  or  the  withholding  of  EU  subsidies.  The  data  come  from  the  World 
Development Indicators.28 Direct EU specific political power is more relevant for reputational costs. 
Member  states,  such  as  Germany  and  France,  which  have  significant  voting  power,  cannot  be 
ignored by others in EU decision-making, even if they may have lost credibility by not abiding with 
previously agreed upon rules. Thus, we use the proportion of times when a member state is pivotal 
(and can, thus, turn a loosing into a winning coalition) under QMV (qualified majority voting) in the 
Council of Ministers (“SSI”) as an indictor of EU-specific political power.29 This indicator also serves 
for the operationalization of the assertiveness and deterrence hypotheses. The power to shape EU 
rules and to deter the Commission, respectively, is strongly mitigated by the highly institutionalized 
context of EU decision-making and the need for coalition-building, as a result of which power 
resources, such as military capabilities, do not carry much weight. Population is relevant but captured 
by “SSI” since the number of votes a member state has is based on the size of its population. 
 
                                                 
27   Keohane 1989; Martin 1992; Moravcsik 1998; Steinberg 2002. 
28   World Bank 2005. 
29   Shapley and Shubik 1954; Rodden 2002.   13 
3.2.  Management 
 
The management school assumes that non-compliance is involuntary. Even if states like to comply 
with a European rule, they are prevented from doing so if the very preconditions that enable states 
to comply are absent. There are three sources of involuntary non-compliance: lacking or insufficient 
state capacities, ambiguous definitions of norms, and inadequate timetables up to which compliance 
has to be achieved.30 While management approaches attribute equal influence to capacities, precision 
of norms, and transposition timetables, the latter two factors relate to the character of individual 
rules and, hence, cannot account for inter-state variation. Therefore, we focus on state capacity 
within this paper.  
 
The concept of state capacity is not used uniformly in the literature and its operationalization differs 
significantly. Resource-centered approaches define capacity as a state’s ability to act, i.e. the sum of 
its legal authority and financial, military, and human resources.31 Neo-institutionalist approaches, by 
contrast, argue that the domestic institutional structure influences the degree of a state’s capacity to 
act and its autonomy to make decisions.32 Thereby, domestic veto players come to the fore, which 
block the implementation of international rules because of the costs they have to (co-) bear.33 A high 
number of veto players reduce the capacity of a state to make the necessary changes to the status quo 
for the implementation of costly rules.34 In order to do justice to both lines of argumentation, we 
differentiate between the government autonomy and the government capacity of states. While government 
autonomy refers to institutional and partisan veto players (and is the higher, the lower the number of 
veto players is), government capacity is geared to the financial endowment of states and their human 
resources. Yet, even if a state has sufficient resources, its administration may still have difficulties in 
pooling and coordinating them, particularly if the required resources are dispersed among various 
public  agencies  (e.g.  ministries)  and  levels  of  government. 35 We  therefore  distinguish  between 
resource endowment and the efficiency of a state bureaucracy to mobilize and channel resources into 
                                                 
30   Chayes and Chayes 1993, 1995; Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell 1998; Young 1992; Haas, Keohane, and 
Levy 1993; Jacobsen and Weiss Brown 1995; Haas 1998. 
31   Przeworski 1990; Haas 1998; Simmons 1998. 
32   Katzenstein 1978; Evans 1995; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985. 
33   Putnam 1988; Duina 1997; Haverland 2000. 
34   Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Tsebelis 2002. 
35   Mbaye 2001; Larrue and Chabason 1998; Egeberg 1999.   14 
the compliance process. Italy and France are two prominent examples of how the two types of 
government capacity may diverge. Both countries command more resources than most of the other 
member states. Yet, their bureaucracies are comparably inefficient and face serious problems of 
corruption. 
 
In the implementation of European norms, both government autonomy and government capacity 
are necessary for the production as well as adaptation of preexisting national legal acts and their 
correct application. Based on these considerations, we derive the following hypothesis from the 
managerial  approach:  The lower government autonomy and the lower government capacity, the more difficult it 
becomes for a member state to comply with European legal norms. Hence, higher rates of infringements can be 
expected for states with low government autonomy and capacity.  
 
Table 2: Overview of the Management Hypotheses 
Government autonomy (H2a)  Government capacity (H2b) 
States with a low level of government autonomy 
infringe on European law more often than more 
autonomous  states  (since  veto  players  might 
block or delay decisions). 
States with a low level of government capacity 
infringe on European law more often than states 
with a high level of capacity (since they do not 
have  the  material  resources  and/or  efficient 
bureaucracies to comply). 
 
Operationalization of the Independent Variables 
To test for the influence of government capacity on the distribution of non-compliance, we include 
two indicators that are prominent in the literature. First of all, we incorporate the GDP per capita 
(“GDPpc”).36 It  is  a  general  measure  for  the  resources,  on  which  a  state  can  draw  to  ensure 
compliance.  The  data  come  form  the  Word  Development  Indicators.37 Whether  a  state  has  the 
capacity to mobilize these resources shall be captured by the second variable, bureaucratic efficiency 
(“efficiency”).  In  the  operationalization,  we  use  an  index  of  bureaucratic  efficiency  and 
professionalism of the public service created by Auer and her colleagues.38 This index consists of 
three  components  of  bureaucratic  efficiency:  performance  related  pay  for  civil  servants,  lack  of 
                                                 
36   Cf. Brautigam 1996. 
37   World Bank 2005. 
38   Mbaye 2001; Auer, Demmke, and Polet 1996.   15 
permanent tenure, and public advertising of open positions. Bureaucratic efficiency highly correlates 
with measures of corruption, e.g. the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.39 
For  issues  with  multicollinearity,  we  include  only  bureaucratic  efficiency  in  our  analyses.  Other 
potential indicators of government capacity – such as bureaucratic quality from the International 
Country Risk Guide and the World Bank governance indicators40 – are not used due to the fact that 
they cover only part of the time period analyzed in this paper and/or lack sufficient variance for 
comparative studies of the EU member states. 
 
Government autonomy is a function of the number of veto players in the political system of a 
member state.41 However, even if the number of the institutional and partisan veto players remains 
constant over time, the interests of these actors – for example regarding (non-) compliance – may 
change. Therefore, we use an alternative veto player index (“polcon”), which allows for the interests 
of veto players in such a way that interdependences between veto players and the respective political 
system are taken into consideration.42 It is based on a simple spatial model of political interaction 
among government branches, measuring the number of independent branches with veto power and 
the distribution of political preferences across these branches. They can be interpreted as a measure 
of  institutional  constraints  that  either  preclude  arbitrary  changes  of  existing  policies  or  produce 
gridlock and so undermine the ability of the government to change policies when such change is 
needed.  Two  alternative  indicators  of  government  autonomy  are  discussed  in  the  literature:  the 
executive control of the parliamentary agenda measured by the extent to which the government can 
successfully  initiate  drafts  and  rely  on  stable  majorities  for  in  the  legislative  branch, 43 and  the 
parliamentary oversight of government measured by the material (e.g. number of Committees) and 
ideational resources (e.g. information processing capacity) relevant for the oversight of the legislative 
on the government.44 We had initially included both these variables, but dropped them because of 
multicollinearity  concerns  and  their  lack  of  significant  (executive  control)  and  robustness 
(parliamentary oversight). 
                                                 
39   Herzfeld and Weiss 2003. 
40   Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006. 
41   Tsebelis 2002; Immergut 1998. 
42   Henisz 2002. Beck et al. 2001 have developed a similar index. 
43   Döring 1995; Tsebelis 2002. 
44   Harfst and Schnapp 2003.   16 
 
3.3.   Legitimacy 
 
Constructivists  draw  on  the  social  logic  of  appropriateness  to  explain  compliance.  States  are 
socialized into the norms and rules of international institutions through processes of social learning 
and persuasion. They comply out of a normative belief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed 
rather  than  because  it  suits  their  instrumental  self-interests.  This  sense  of  moral  obligation  is  a 
function of the legitimacy of the rules themselves or their sources.45 There are several ways by which 
legitimacy can be generated. First, the rule is embedded in an underlying institution or a legal system, 
which  is  generally  characterized  by  a  high  level  of  legitimacy  (acceptance  of  the  rule-setting 
institution).46 Second, a critical number of states is already complying with an international rule. As a 
result, other states are “pulled” into compliance because they want to demonstrate that they conform 
to  the group  of  states,  to  which they  want  to belong  and  whose esteem  they  care  about  (peer 
pressure).47 Third, legitimacy can also result from certain procedures that include those actors in the 
rule-making that are potentially affected and who engage in processes of persuasion and mutual 
learning  (procedural  legitimacy).48 Both,  procedural  legitimacy  and  peer  pressure  focus  more  on 
compliance with individual rules (exactly those which result from ‘fair’ decision-making processes or 
those  with  which  other  states  already  comply).  The  acceptance  of  the  rule-setting  institution 
hypothesis emphasizes that voluntary compliance is generated by diffuse support for and general 
acceptance  of  the  rule-setting  institutions and  the  constitutive  principles  of  the  law-making  and 
standing.  Since  our  unit  of  analysis  are  country  years  and  we  study  infringements  rather  than 
individually violated legal acts, we focus in this paper on the acceptance of and support for the rule-
setting institution. 
 
The institutional legitimacy hypothesis can itself be disentangled into two different variants, which 
stress different institutional aspects: the rule of law and the rule-setting institution.  
 
                                                 
45   Hurd 1999; Franck 1990; Finnemore and Toope 2001; Checkel 2001. 
46   Hurd 1999; Kohler-Koch 2000. 
47   Franck 1990; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. 
48   Dworkin 1986; Hurrell 1995; Franck 1995.   17 
Domestic Culture of Law-abidingness and Support for the Rule of Law  
Legal sociological studies refer to the relation between national legal cultures and their inclinations 
for compliance with national norms.49 Legal cultures comprise three elements: (1) the characteristics 
of legal awareness, (2) general attitudes towards the supremacy of law, and (3) general attitudes 
towards the judicial system and its values.50 In this perspective, the degree of compliance correlates 
with  the  extent  to  which  rule  addressees accept  the  legitimacy  of  the  rule  of  law  and consider 
compliance with legal norms as demanded by a domestic logic of appropriateness. The acceptance of 
a rule and the subsequent inclination to comply with it result from the diffuse support for law-
making as a legitimate means to ensuring political order in a community.51 Consequently, even costly 
rules will principally be complied with. While this argument was developed for compliance with 
domestic laws, it should also apply to international and European rules since they also constitute law. 
This is all the more true for the EU, where European law is the law of the land because of its 
supremacy and direct effect. The corresponding hypothesis (H3a) states that the lower the public support 
for the principle of the rule of law in a member state, the more often European law is infringed on. 
 
Support for the EU as the Rule-setting Institution 
The  explanation  of  rule-consistent  behavior  due  to  diffuse  support  can  not  only  refer  to  the 
acceptance of the law as a means to the insurance of political order in a community. It can also refer 
to the institution responsible for rule-setting. Rules are not only complied with because laws ought to 
be obeyed, but because the rules are set by institutions, which enjoy a high degree of support.52 
Therefore, the second legitimacy hypothesis (H3b) states that member states with a high public supports for 
the  EU  as a  rule-setting  institution  infringe  European  Law  less  often  than member states  with  a  EU-skeptic 
population. 
 
                                                 
49   Gibson and Caldeira 1996; Jacob et al. 1996. 
50   Gibson and Caldeira 1996. 
51   Easton 1965; Habermas 1992. 
52   Dworkin 1986; Hurrell 1995; Gibson and Caldeira 1995.   18 
Table 3: Overview of the Legitimacy Hypotheses 
Rule of law (H3a)  Support (H3b) 
States  with  lower  levels  of  support  for  the 
principle of the rule of law infringe on European 
law  more  often  than  states  with  higher  levels 
(since  they  feel  a  lower  sense  of  obligation  to 
comply with law in general). 
States with lower public support for the EU as a 
rule-setting institution infringe on European law 
more  often  than  states  with  higher  public 
support  (since  they  feel  a  lower  sense  of 
obligation to comply with European law). 
 
Operationalization of the Independent Variables 
In principle, the operationalization of the rule of law hypothesis is unproblematic. The extent of the 
support for the rule of law can be quantified on the basis of opinion poll data (“rule of law”). Yet, 
good data are rare and the rule of law or ‘law and order tradition’, as it is better known from the 
International Country Risk Guide, indicator provided by the World Bank dose not cover the full time 
period of our analysis.53 Therefore, we use James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira’s opinion poll 
survey data, even though they only provide data for the EU 12 member states.54 The data measure 
the extent of support for the rule of law on the basis of agreement with the following statements: “it 
is not necessary to obey a law which I consider unfair”, “sometimes it is better to ignore a law and to 
directly solve problems instead of awaiting legal solution” as well as “if I do not agree with a rule, it 
is okay to violate it as long as I pay attention to not being discovered”.  
 
Data on public support for the EU are available from Eurobarometer surveys. The acceptance of 
European  institutions  can  be  quantified  by  the  question  which  refers  to  the  support  of  the 
membership of one’s own country in the European Union (“EU support”).  
 
So  far,  we  have  treated  the  three  compliance  approaches  as  competing  or  at  least  alternative 
explanation for member state compliance. The next section will discuss to what extent the three 
approaches  can  be  combined.  Why  should  power,  capacity  and  legitimacy  not  have  joint  and 
conditionals effect on member states’ compliance, i.e. reinforcing or undermining their individual 
influence? 
 
                                                 
53   Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006. 
54   Gibson and Caldeira 1996.   19 
3.4.  Towards an Integrated Approach 
 
The compliance literature has been rather skeptical about combining different approaches because of 
their  diverging  assumptions  regarding  “how  the  international  system  works,  the  possibilities  for 
governance with international law, and the policy tools that are available and should be used to 
handle implementation problems”.55 Yet, empirical studies support explanations based on power, 
capacity, as well as legitimacy.56 Likewise, the European Union and many international organizations 
use a combination of management, enforcement, and legitimacy mechanisms to induce member state 
compliance.57 Combining explanatory factors of the different approaches makes not only empirically 
sense. Their theoretical assumptions are not always that incompatible either.  
 
Power and Capacity 
Enforcement theories conceptualize compliance as a strategic choice by actors who weigh the costs 
of compliance against the benefits. The management school, by contrast, emphasizes the importance 
of capacity to make and act upon (rational) choices in the first place. If actors lack the necessary 
resources, they have no other choice but to defect. This offers a fruitful opportunity to combine 
management and enforcement approaches: the effect of power on compliance is conditional on 
capacity. In binary terms, power only matters if states have the general capacity to comply. While 
countries with no capacity would be bad compliers irrespective of their power, high-capacity member 
states could still choose whether to comply if they had the power to resist or deter enforcement 
pressures by the Commission. H1a and H1c would then become conditional on sufficient capacity. 
Statistically, such a relation would suggest a significant interaction effect between power and capacity. 
 
The effects of power and capacity could interact, reinforcing or undermining each other. Member 
states  with  both  the  capacity  to  comply  and  the  power  to  shape  EU  rules  according  to  their 
preferences should be better compliers than countries that lack both or have only high capacities to 
cope with the costs of compliance or the power of assertiveness. Conversely, member states with the 
                                                 
55   Raustiala and Victor 1998: 681; cf. Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 543. 
56   Tallberg 2002; Mbaye 2001; Haas 1998; Mendrinou 1996; Steunenberg 2006; Mastenbroek 2003, 2005; 
Reinhardt 2001; Steinberg 2002; see also Zürn and Joerges 2005. 
57   Tallberg 2002; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Keohane, Haas, and Levy 1993; Mitchell 1996; Zürn and 
Joerges 2005.   20 
power to deter or resist the enforcement pressures (i.e. power of deterrence and recalcitrance) might 
be less inclined to do so if they have the capacity to comply. Likewise, countries which have neither 
capacity nor power might have to make greater efforts to mobilize additional resources than their 
powerful counterparts, which can defy compliance pressures.  
 
Capacity and Legitimacy 
The conditioning effect of capacity can also apply to the relation between legitimacy and (non-) 
compliance. The difference between legitimacy and enforcement approaches is that state choices are 
less  guided  by  an  instrumental  logic  of  cost-benefit  calculations,  but  by  a  normative  logic  of 
appropriateness. Actors who seek to do what is socially accepted need as much capacity as actors, 
who  are  driven  by  the strategic  maximization  of  their  self-interests.  Like  in  the  case  of  power, 
capacity can be a scope condition for H3a and H3b. 
 
Member states, which have strong capacities and value the law and/or the EU as a law-making 
institution, should be better compliers than countries with similar capacities, but less support for the 
rule of law and/or the EU. Likewise, countries with lower capacities and higher support should make 
a greater effort to comply than their counterparts with equally weak capacities, but citizens that are 
less law-abiding and supportive of the EU. Beside this positive interaction effect of capacity and 
legitimacy with respect to compliance, we can also conceive of a direct and negative relation between 
the independent variables capacity and legitimacy themselves, which might bring about a negative, 
albeit spurious effect of EU support on compliance. The literature has found that support for the 
EU and the rule of law, respectively, is directly linked to a lack of state capacity. Citizens of states 
with weak capacities have low support for the rule of law since domestic legislation is only weakly 
enforced.58 Consequently,  they  turn  to  the  EU  as  an  institution  that  may  be  more  effective  in 
providing public goods. 59 As a somehow counterintuitive consequence, those member states most 
supportive of the EU might be among the worst compliers since the EU may produce rules for the 
provision of public goods, but member states still lack the capacity to effectively implement them on 
the ground (cf. graph 3). This is corroborated by IR scholars, who argue that states have an incentive 
                                                 
58   Putnam 1993; Levi 1998; Tyler 1998, Rothstein 2004 
59   Sánchez-Cuenca 2000.   21 
to delegate authority to international institutions to achieve policy outcomes that cannot be realized 
at the domestic level due to powerful veto players or lacking resources.60  
 
Graph 3: Capacity, Legitimacy, and Compliance 
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Power and Legitimacy 
The  combination  of  enforcement  and  legitimacy  approaches  is  more  problematic since they are 
based  on  different  theories  of  social  action.  Despite  attempts  to  integrate  rationalist  and 
constructivist reasoning, synthetic explanations of (non-) compliance are still rare.61 They tend to 
focus on the scope conditions for the two different logics of social action. In a similar vein, we 
would argue that states that have power can do as they please (conditional on capacity), but what 
pleases them may well be defined by a normative logic that makes compliance the socially expected 
and accepted behavior – if their population is supportive of the rule of law and the EU, respectively. 
Moreover, powerful states, whose citizens strongly support the rule of law and show little support 
for the EU, respectively, may be more inclined to use their power of assertiveness to shape EU rules 
according to the preferences of their constituencies. 
 
                                                 
60   Simmons 2002; Simmons and Martin 1998: 747-748; Keohane 1984; Putnam 1988; Keohane and Nye 
1977; Ruggie 1983. 
61   But see Checkel 2001; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.   22 
Table 4: Overview of the Integrated Hypotheses 
Power and Capacity  Capacity and Legitimacy  Power and Legitimacy 
H4a: 
With  increasing  capacity,  the 
positive effect of the power of 
recalcitrance  (H1a)  and  the 
negative effect of the power of 
deterrence  (H1c)  on  the 
propensity of member states to 
infringe  on  European  law  are 
reduced.  
H4c: 
With  increasing  capacity,  the 
negative effects of the support 
for  the  rule  of  law  (H3a)  and 
the EU (H3b), respectively, on 
the propensity of member states 
to infringe on European law is 
reinforced. 
H4e: 
With increasing support for the 
rule  of  law  and  the  EU,  the 
positive effect of the power of 
recalcitrance  (H1a)  and  the 
negative effect of the power of 
deterrence  (H1c)  on  the 
propensity of member states to 
infringe  on  European  law  are 
reduced.  
H4b: 
With  increasing  capacity,  the 
negative effect of the power of 
assertiveness  (H1b)  on  the 
propensity of member states to 
infringe  on  European  law  is 
reinforced. 
H4d:  
Capacity affects both legitimacy 
and  compliance  –  lower 
capacity of a member state leads 
to higher public support for the 
EU,  but  still  results  in  a  high 
frequency of infringements. 
H4f: 
With increasing support for the 
rule  of  law  and  decreasing 
support  for  the  EU,  the 
negative effect of the power of 
assertiveness  (H1b)  on  the 
propensity of member states to 
infringe  on  European  law  is 
reinforced. 
 
 
4.   Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we report the results of our quantitative tests of the effects of power, capacity, and 
legitimacy on non-compliance.62 We discuss the findings in turn, referring to the models 1-5 of table 
5, which estimate the influence of each of the three theoretical approaches simultaneously controlling 
for the influences of at least one other approach at a time. The models comprise the most promising 
variables  of  each  theoretical  account,  which  were  discussed  in  the  respective  sections  on  the 
operationalization  of  the  independent  variables.  While  model  one  consists  of  the  basic  model 
without  interactions,  models  2  to  4  respectively  test  the  three  different  groups  of  integrated 
                                                 
62   The regression results were generated using the statistics software package Intercooled Stata 9.2. We 
tested for first- and higher order autocorrelation. None was found. Problems of heteroscedasticity were 
counteracted by the use robust standard errors with clustering on member states. As to unobserved 
heterogeneity, we decided against the use of fixed effects (cf. Plümper, Manow and Tröger 2005).   23 
hypotheses – power and capacity, capacity and legitimacy, and power and legitimacy. Model 5 brings 
these  separate  models  together  in  one  single  integrated  model,  without  adding  any  three-way 
interaction terms for power, capacity, and legitimacy.63 In all models, we add time dummies64 to 
control  for  unobserved  temporal  heterogeneity  and  period  effects  that  go  beyond  the  growing 
number of legal acts, discussed in section 2.1 above. 
 
                                                 
63   This model serves solely illustrative purposes as it does not lend itself to substantive interpretation due to 
being  ridden  by  multicollinearity.  In  fact,  while  variation  inflation  factors  above  10  are  usually 
considered evidence of multicollinearity in a model, in model 5 they are in the hundreds. Please also 
compare the correlation matrix of the independent variables in the appendix  
64    The time dummies are a set of binary variables for T-1 years of our study.   24 
Table 5: Capacity, Power, Legitimacy, and Infringements 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Power:           
GDP  -0.0000  -0.0000    -0.0001**  0.0001 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)    (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
0.0336**  0.0264**    0.0517***  0.0202  Shapley Shubik  
   Index  (0.0122)  (0.0090)    (0.0099)  (0.0164) 
Capacity:           
GDPpc  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0000    -0.0000 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
Efficiency  -0.2227**  -0.2469***  -0.3008**    -0.2259** 
  (0.0869)  (0.0235)  (0.0988)    (0.0792) 
Polcon  0.0176  -0.1187  -0.3921    0.0385 
  (0.2788)  (0.3248)  (0.3987)    (0.3847) 
Legitimacy:           
Rule of law  -0.0020    0.0050  -0.0170***  -0.0019 
  (0.0089)    (0.0089)  (0.0037)  (0.0064) 
EU support  0.0011    -0.0030  0.0052**  0.0028 
  (0.0023)    (0.0024)  (0.0018)  (0.0021) 
Interaction Effects:           
  -0.0107**      -0.0167  SSI * Efficiency 
  (0.0043)      (0.0129) 
    -0.0103    0.0081  Rule of law *  
   Efficiency      (0.0078)    (0.0086) 
    -0.0047    -0.0028  EU support *  
   Efficiency      (0.0034)    (0.0020) 
      0.0013  0.0013  SSI * Rule of law 
      (0.0011)  (0.0010) 
      0.0015**  0.0008  SSI * EU support 
      (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
           
Constant  0.1091  0.1167  0.1700*  0.1815*  0.0776 
  (0.0961)  (0.0908)  (0.0927)  (0.0907)  (0.0966) 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  233  233  233  233  233 
Adjusted R-squared  0.48  0.50  0.40  0.50  0.53 
Dependent variable is reasoned opinions per legal act. OLS regressions with two-tailed t-tests. Robust (Hubert/White) 
standard errors (with clustering on member states) in parentheses. *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1. 
 
4.1.   Enforcement 
 
The results give support to the recalcitrance hypothesis (H1a). The political weight in the Council of 
Ministers (“SSI”) has a significant effect on infringements per legal act. Member states like France, 
Italy, or Germany have more Council votes and violate European law more frequently than member   25 
states with low voting power, such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden, or the Netherlands (cf. table 5, 
models 1, 2, and 4). Greater economic power, by contrast, does not substantially affect a countries 
compliance record. The size of the economy does not matter when it comes to infringements on 
European law. Note, however, that the recalcitrance hypothesis has difficulties in accounting for the 
compliance  performance  of  the  United  Kingdom,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Greece,  Belgium,  and 
Portugal, on the other. While the former complies much better compared with other ‘big countries’, 
such as France and Italy, the latter three have considerably less voting power and still belong to the 
worst compliers.  
 
To better understand these ‘outliers’, we have to inspect model 2 more closely. The negative and 
significant interaction effect of voting power and bureaucratic efficiency indicates what can also be 
read  of  graphs  4  and  5.  Whereas  graph  4  depicts  how  the  conditional  slopes  of  voting  power 
decreases  with  increasing  levels  of  bureaucratic  efficiency  and  the  non-interacted  independent 
variables held constant at their mean, graph 5 shows the marginal effect of the political weight in the 
Council  of  Ministers  on  non-compliance  across  the  observed  range  of  the  modifying  variable 
“efficiency” with 95 percent confidence intervals. Irrespective of their differences, both graphs give 
support to the integrated hypothesis H4a. Increases in capacity make the non-compliance promoting 
effects of power less pronounced. This explains why the United Kingdom outperforms its powerful 
counterparts when it comes to compliance with European legislation.   
   26 
Graph 4: Power and Capacity – Conditional Slopes 
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Graph 5: Power and Capacity – Marginal Effect 
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The assertiveness hypothesis (H1b) states that more powerful states infringe European law less often 
than weaker states, since they have been able to decrease the costs of compliance by shaping the law 
according to their preferences. It is tested in exactly the same way as the recalcitrance hypothesis 
(H1a) above using the same indicators. The only difference is our expectation with respect to the 
signs of our independent power variables. This holds also true for the deterrence hypothesis (H1c). It 
predicts the same outcome as the assertiveness hypothesis, but draws on another causal mechanism, 
namely the likelihood that enforcement authorities shy away from enforcing compliance. Powerful 
member states have fewer infringements than weaker ones since the European Commission and the 
ECJ are deterred to a greater extend. As our findings in table 5 have already given support to the 
recalcitrance  hypothesis,  the  assertiveness  hypothesis  and  the  deterrence  hypothesis  have  to  be 
rejected. One should note, however, that the rejection of the deterrence hypothesis doe not suggest 
that  the  Commission  might  not  decide  strategically  on  which  infringement  cases  to  prosecute. 
However, our expert survey clearly indicates that if the Commission strategically enforced European 
Law,  such  behavior  would  not  systematically  disadvantage  particular  member  states  (see  section 
2.1.).65 
 
The  integrated  hypotheses  of  power  and  legitimacy  (H4e  and  H4f)  scores  just  as  bad  as  the 
assertiveness and deterrence hypotheses. While the interaction effect between the Shapley Shubik 
Index and support for the rule of law is not significantly different from zero, the interaction effect 
between political power and public support for the EU is positive. This implies that with increasing 
support, the positive effect of the power of recalcitrance on the propensity of member states to 
infringe on European law is not reduced, but increased. In other words, the effect of power on non-
compliance is not conditional on the presence or absence of the rule of law and EU support seems 
to make recalcitrant member states even more recalcitrant.   
 
                                                 
65   To properly test the deterrence hypothesis, we would need the population of infringement cases and 
compare it to those infringements denounced by the Commission. However, we only have Commission 
data. Therefore, we cannot statistically test whether the Commission is systematically biased towards 
particular member states.   28 
4.2.  Management 
 
Testing the effect of government autonomy and government capacity on non-compliance, we find a 
strong relation between the government capacity of a member state and its number of infringements 
(cf. table 5, models 1-3 and 5). While general capacity measured by GDP per capita has no significant 
effect on compliance, we can see that larger bureaucratic efficiency brings about fewer violations of 
European  law.  The  coefficient  for  the  efficiency  of  civil  servants  is  negative  and  significantly 
different from zero. This is in line with other studies, which also find that the command of resources 
appear to be less an issue in the EU.66 Compliance appears to depend much more on the capacity to 
mobilize  existing  resources. This explains why France  and  Italy, which  belong  to the  wealthiest 
member states of the EU, are as bad compliers as relatively poor countries like Greece and Portugal. 
 
Government autonomy, by contrast, seems to have no effect on the number of infringements. The 
“polcon” coefficients are not significant in any model. In fact, they even change their algebraic sign 
depending on the model specification. If anything, previous studies have revealed that countries with 
several veto players commit fewer violations of European law than countries with a small number of 
veto players.67 Both, the literatures on consensual democracies and decision-making in the EU can 
offer tentative explanations for this counterintuitive finding. On the one hand, if domestic constrains 
prevent governments form concluding far-reaching agreements in Brussels, 68 there is no good reason 
for veto players to blockade the implementation of European rules. On the other hand, Arendt 
Lijphart has argued that high horizontal and vertical dispersion of policy competencies fosters the 
inclusion of diverse societal interests into political processes and outcomes.69 It forces political actors 
to construct broad compromises and comply with them, even in cases in which their own interests 
are not fully included. In order to avoid deadlocks, consensual democracies develop political cultures 
with inclinations towards diffuse reciprocity. Yet, the group of compliance laggards, which includes 
unitary member states, such as Greece and France, as well as regionalized Italy and federal Belgium, 
indicates that government autonomy is a poor predictor for compliance.  
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In a nutshell, the government autonomy hypothesis (H2a) has to be rejected, while government 
capacity defined as bureaucratic efficiency (H2b) has a strong negative effect on the number of 
infringements. In fact, and as has been discussed above, bureaucratic efficiency has an additional 
desirable property: It improves the propensity of powerful member states to comply with European 
law (cf. H4a).  
 
4.3.   Legitimacy 
 
The statistical analysis finds hardly any significant correlation between the support for the rule of law 
and the frequency of violations of European law (H3a). Only model 4 indicates that infringements of 
EU law are rarer in countries, in which the principle of the rule of law is supported. This is definitely 
not enough evidence to state that the rule of law hypothesis is confirmed. However, we need to keep 
in  mind  the  data  issues discussed above.  We  would  need  much  better  data for  a  more  reliable 
statement about the influence of legal culture on the degree of compliance. 
 
As to the question of support for the EU, we find mixed and contra-intuitive results. These results 
can be traced back to the issue addressed in graph 3 and our  integrated ‘hypothesis’ H4d. Due to the 
close relationship between the right-hand side capacity and legitimacy variables, our models 1-3 and 5 
suffer from multicollinearity, thereby increasing standard errors and negating any significant and 
meaningful findings with respect to EU support and non-compliance. If anything, we rather find a 
positive correlation between public support for the EU and infringements of European law than the 
negative effect we would anticipate in line with hypothesis H3b. Countries, in which the population 
is particularly supportive of European integration, infringe more frequently on legal acts than EU-
skeptic countries like Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, which comply particularly well 
with European law.  
 
In sum, the rule of law hypothesis (H3a) could probably be confirmed with better data. The support 
hypothesis (H3b), on the contrary, has to be rejected, since the results do not support the expected 
negative effect of EU support on non-compliance. However, these findings are less surprising if we 
evaluate them in light of our second integrated capacity and legitimacy hypothesis (H4d). This may 
also  explain  why  our  data  do  not  support  the  interaction  between  capacity  and  legitimacy  as 
hypothesized in hypothesis (H4c): Neither do we find negative effects of the support for the rule of   30 
law and the EU on the propensity of member states to infringe on European law in model 3, nor are 
they reinforced by capacity. 
 
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyzed why some member states violate European legal acts more frequently than 
others. In a first step, we developed hypotheses based on three prominent theoretical approaches. 
The management school of thought argues that non-compliance is not a strategic choice, but occurs 
whenever states lack the necessary government capacity and government autonomy to properly and 
timely implement international rules. The enforcement approach provides three hypotheses on the 
importance  of  power  for  the  distribution  of  non-compliance  (recalcitrance,  assertiveness,  and 
deterrence). Researchers devoted to the study of legitimacy and non-compliance argue that neither 
power, nor lack of capacity determines non-compliance, but that acceptance of rules as standards for 
appropriate  behavior  is  the  relevant  independent  variable.  While  there  are  many  ways  in  which 
legitimacy might affect (non-) compliance with rules, we focused in this paper on testing the extent 
to which the support for the principle of the rule of law as well as the acceptance of the rule-setting 
institution explain the level of (non-) compliance in the member states. Instead of merely treating the 
three approaches as alternative or even competing explanations, we discussed different possibilities 
in which their explanatory factors could be combined in a theoretically consistent and meaningful 
way. 
 
In a second step, we extensively tested the empirical implications of all hypotheses, derived from these 
three  theoretical  approaches  and  their  combinations,  with  panel-econometrical  methods.  Our 
regression results show that capacity-centered, power-centered, and legitimacy-based models explain 
some of the variance of annual infringements per European legal act in force (cf. table 5). Combining 
the variables from all three approaches we explain more than 50% of the observed variance on the 
dependent variable. Even though one should not overstate the informative value of the adjusted R-
squared statistic, it still highlights the substantial explanatory power of our model. 
 
Especially the combination of the power of recalcitrance (H1a) and bureaucratic efficiency (H2b), as 
depicted in graph 6, yields promising results (cf. H4a). Our quantitative analyses reveal that powerful   31 
states, like France and Italy, which have a great share of votes in the Council, are less sensitive to 
enforcement costs and, therefore, have a higher share of infringements than weaker member states. 
Countries with high capacities, such as Denmark, Finland, or the United Kingdom, have a better 
compliance record than states with lower capacities, such as Greece, Portugal, or Belgium. Yet, 
important outliers remain. Great Britain is as powerful as France and Italy, but complies much better. 
Conversely, Greece is one of the least powerful countries in the EU, but almost as bad a complier as 
powerful  France  and  Italy.  This  can  be  explained  by  combining  and  interacting  the  managerial 
variable  government  capacity  and  the  power  of  recalcitrance  variable  (“SSI”).  States  with  high 
capacities and low political power infringe on European law less frequently than other member states. 
In  other  words,  the  combination  of  low  government  capacity  and  great  political  power  brings 
together  inability  to  comply  and  the  necessary  political  weight  to  be  recalcitrant  in  the  face  of 
looming sanctions. Hence, we expect and find states, such as Italy or France, which have a great 
share  of  votes  in  the  Council,  but  are  characterized  by  low  government  capacity,  to  have  a 
comparatively high number of infringement proceedings opened.  
 
Graph 6: Power, Capacity, and Compliance 
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These findings indicate some pathways for future research. First of all, our findings point to the 
importance of disentangling specific variants of each approach. Within the enforcement approach,   32 
both the assertiveness and the deterrence variant had to be rejected, while the recalcitrance approach 
turned out to have explanatory power for the occurrence of non-compliance. The same holds true 
for the management approach, in which only the capacity of a government seems to be causally 
related  to  the  number  of  infringements  between  member  states.  With  regard  to  the  legitimacy 
approach, only the support for the rule of law variant has potential to explain member states’ non-
compliance with European law. However, all variants are also closely related to each other and not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. This is particularly the case for the power-centered approaches, in 
which both the recalcitrance and the deterrence hypothesis refer to the relationship between the 
deviant  and  the  enforcement  authority.  Thus,  we  could  argue  that  the  confirmation  of  the 
recalcitrance hypothesis does not only reveal insights about why member states do not comply, but 
that it could also be interpreted as the inclination of the enforcement authority to open infringement 
proceedings against powerful member states. However, this argument only holds true if we use 
infringement proceedings as a proxy for non-compliance. Further research has to focus on testing 
this argument by using different proxies.  
 
Second, our findings suggest going a step further and combine specific parts of different theoretical 
approaches to explaining non-compliance with law beyond the nation-state. While a combination of 
variables  from  the  enforcement  and  the  management  approach  turned  out  to  have  the  greatest 
explanatory power, we still have to find alternative ways for explaining the (non-) effect of legitimacy. 
Are  there  other  ways  of  theorizing  and  testing  the  relationship  between  the  support  for  EU 
institutions and compliance performance than by linking it to government capacity? In other words, 
does the legitimacy approach have explanatory power in its own right? This is particular relevant a 
question because we have tested only two variants of the legitimacy argument neglecting factors, 
such as procedural fairness or peer pressure. 
 
Finally, while the overall fit of our integrated model is quite good, a significant amount of variation 
still remains  to  be  explained.  Moreover,  our  integrated model  has  two  ‘outlying’  member states 
whose compliance records cannot be adequately accounted for by the combination of power- and 
capacity-centered models: Germany and Spain. While the latter performs better than predicted by the 
integrated  model  and  has  an  overall  medium  level  of  infringements,  the  former  has  a  worse 
compliance record than expected given its capacity. Part of the reason why a considerable share of 
non-compliance remains unexplained may be that the compliance literature in International Relations   33 
has largely neglected policy-related explanations as developed in the early implementation literature.70 
International  Relations  approaches  focus  on  country  variables,  such  as  power,  capacity,  and 
legitimacy, but neglect that these variables can vary within states. A more fine-grained approach 
would argue that financial and administrative capacities are scare resources and that their internal 
redistribution might vary between policy fields. States prioritize certain issues vis-à-vis others and are 
therefore likely to allocate more funding in their national budgets and invest more human resources 
in  them.  This  line  of  reasoning  also  implies  that  states  might  adjust  their  spending  priorities 
according to the preferences of their electorate, meaning that, for example, a green government 
could be willing to spend more money on environmental policy, compared to conservative, liberal, or 
social democratic governments. ‘Bringing policy back in’ could also be a fruitful way to account for 
variations within individual states and between policy fields or specific norms.  
 
So, what does the European Union teach us about non-compliance in international politics? The EU 
is often regarded as a system sui generis whose unique supranational properties (e.g. supremacy and 
direct effect of European law)71 preclude generalizations to other international institutions. However, 
if we adopt a fine grained perspective, ultimately, any political institution is one of its kind. To make 
fruitful  comparisons,  we  need  to  climb  up  the  ladder  of  abstraction.72 Hence,  the  potential  for 
generalizations depends on the properties that are looked at. While the EU is the most legalized 
system in the world,73 its institutionalized compliance mechanisms can also be found elsewhere.74 
Our study has two important implications for compliance with law beyond the nation state. First, 
states with both, low capacities and high shares of power are compliance laggards and delimit the 
power of law beyond the nation state. They lack the capacity to easily comply with international law 
and, at the same time, are not willing to introduce major resource-redistributions and investments, 
but rather rely on their ability to resist enforcement pressure.  
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Second, the twinning of management and enforcement instruments is, indeed, an effective way to 
restore  compliance. 75 The  combination  of  managerial  dialogue,  capacity  building,  and  penalties 
addresses the two major sources of non-compliance identified by our study. However, two caveats 
are in order:  
(i)  The managerial instrument of capacity-building is not sufficient in restoring compliance, if it 
merely entails the transfer of resources to non-compliant states. Rather, it is essential to foster 
bureaucratic  efficiency,  e.g.  by  promoting  anti-corruption  measures  as  part  of  ‘good 
governance’.76  
(ii)  Even highly legalized institutions, such as the EU, the World Trade Organization, and Andean 
Community, where monitoring and sanctioning powers are delegated to third parties,77 do not 
completely mitigate power differences between states.  
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7.   Appendix 
 
  GDP  SSI  GDPpc  Efficiency  Polcon  Rule of law  EU support  SSI * 
Efficiency 
Rule of law 
* Efficiency 
SSI * Rule 
of law 
EU support 
* Efficiency 
                       
GDP  1.00                     
SSI  0.77  1.00                   
GDPpc  0.11  -0.27  1.00                 
Efficiency  0.20  0.14  0.25  1.00               
Polcon  -0.28  -0.31  0.37  -0.11  1.00             
Rule of law  0.32  0.44  0.01  0.77  -0.0653  1.00           
EU support  -0.19  -0.23  0.13  -0.49  0.2303  -0.35  1.00         
SSI * Efficiency  -0.35  -0.42  -0.04  -0.02  -0.1048  -0.32  -0.01  1.00       
Rule of law * 
Efficiency 
-0.41  -0.38  0.10  0.35  -0.1472  -0.15  -0.36  0.61  1.00     
SSI * Rule of 
law 
-0.09  0.10  -0.08  -0.11  -0.2278  -0.19  0.02  0.64  0.4964  1.00   
EU support * 
Efficiency 
0.09  -0.01  -0.19  -0.41  -0.0119  -0.33  -0.03  -0.17  -0.3461  -0.39  1.00 
SSI * EU 
support 
-0.02  -0.07  -0.10  -0.13  0.2171  0.02  -0.03  -0.63  -0.4180  -0.66  0.32 
 